In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
spi: spi-qpic-snand: write the feature value before executing SET_FEATURE
qcom_spi_send_cmdaddr() programs NAND_FLASH_CMD/NAND_EXEC_CMD and submits
the descriptors, which makes the controller execute the command
immediately. For SPINAND_SET_FEATURE the value to be written is only
placed into NAND_FLASH_FEATURES afterwards, by qcom_spi_io_op(), in a
second submission – so the chip is programmed with whatever that register
happened to hold from a previous operation, and the intended value is only
applied by the *next* SET_FEATURE.
Measured on a TP-Link Archer AX55 v1 (IPQ5018, ESMT F50L1G41LB): writing
0x40 to the configuration register (0xb0) leaves the chip at 0x00, and the
subsequent write of 0x00 leaves it at 0x40 – every write lands one
operation late.
This stayed unnoticed until v6.18 added SPI-NAND OTP support together
with OTP entries for ESMT chips. spinand_otp_rw() enables OTP mode,
reads, and disables it again, and mtd_otp_nvmem_add() does this during
MTD registration. With the off-by-one, the “disable” write actually
applies the previously requested value, so CFG_OTP_ENABLE ends up set:
the chip stays in OTP mode, every subsequent array read returns the OTP
area instead of the array (UBI reports an empty device) and all writes
fail with -EIO because the OTP area is write protected. On this board
that makes the whole flash unusable and the device unbootable.
Write the feature value into NAND_FLASH_FEATURES as part of the same
transaction, before NAND_EXEC_CMD. While at it, copy only the bytes the
operation actually carries – the previous code dereferenced a 4-byte
pointer on a one-byte buffer (spinand->scratchbuf).
With this patch the flash contents read back bit-identical to a
known-good dump of the same board taken under the vendor firmware
(md5-verified across partitions), and writes work.
