In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: keep chunk->transport in step with the list it is queued on
__sctp_outq_flush_rtx() moves a gap-acked chunk onto another transport’s
transmitted list without updating chunk->transport:
if (chunk->tsn_gap_acked) {
list_move_tail(&chunk->transmitted_list,
&transport->transmitted);
continue;
}
The chunk then sits on a live transport’s list while chunk->transport still
names a different one. If that transport is removed – sctp_assoc_rm_peer()
from an ASCONF Delete-IP – sctp_transport_free() RCU-frees it and the chunk
is left with a dangling pointer. sctp_assoc_rm_peer() scrubs
peer->transmitted and asoc->outqueue.out_chunk_list, but the chunk is on
neither.
The pointer is not followed while tsn_gap_acked is set. A SACK that
reneges on the TSN clears the flag, and the next SACK reaches
tchunk->transport->flight_size -= sctp_data_size(tchunk);
inside the freed transport. KASAN reports a slab-use-after-free read in
sctp_check_transmitted(), freed from sctp_assoc_rm_peer(). Both the
removal and the SACKs come from the association peer.
Set chunk->transport at the move. The ordinary resend path needs nothing:
it reaches its list_move_tail() only after sctp_packet_append_chunk()
returned SCTP_XMIT_OK, and __sctp_packet_append_chunk() has rebound the
chunk by then.
Discovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee
