一线运维实战手记 · 云计算 · 数据库 · 故障排查
2026年9月4日

CVE-2026-47065 [CRITICAL] – ZDRES-232: resolveProxyClass Not Overridden – acceptMatchers Filter Bypass via java.lang.r

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ZDRES-232: resolveProxyClass Not Overridden – acceptMatchers Filter Bypass via java.lang.reflect.Proxy

Assessment: Fully addressed.

When the serialised stream contains a TC_PROXYCLASSDESC (the marker
for a java.lang.reflect.Proxy ), JDK’s ObjectInputStream.readProxyDesc()
is
dispatched. JDK then calls the default
ObjectInputStream.resolveProxyClass(interfaces) implementation, which
performs Class.forName(intf, false, latestUserDefinedLoader()) for EACH
interface name and constructs the proxy class — bypassing the accepted
classes list .

ZDRES-233: Class.forName(name, initialize=true, classLoader) in
readClassDescriptor Triggers Static Initialiser of Allow-Listed Classes

Assessment: Fully addressed.

For ANY class on the allow-list, deserialising a stream that names it triggers the class’s
(static initialiser) BEFORE any instance is constructed. This means an
attacker who supplies a class name on the allow-list (e.g., the
developer wrote accept(“com.myapp.*”) , attacker supplies
com.myapp.SomeClass ) causes of SomeClass — and many
real-world classes have side-effecting static initialisers

Both issues have been fixed.