{"id":7023,"date":"2026-09-04T18:49:23","date_gmt":"2026-09-04T10:49:23","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/?vuln=cve-2026-72380"},"modified":"2026-09-04T18:49:23","modified_gmt":"2026-09-04T10:49:23","slug":"cve-2026-72380","status":"publish","type":"vuln","link":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/?vuln=cve-2026-72380","title":{"rendered":"CVE-2026-72380 [HIGH] &#8211; In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nxen\/pvcalls: bound ba"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<\/p>\n<p>xen\/pvcalls: bound backend response req_id before indexing rsp[]<\/p>\n<p>pvcalls_front_event_handler() takes req_id directly from the<br \/>\nbackend-supplied ring response and uses it to index the fixed-size<br \/>\nbedata-&gt;rsp[] array for a memcpy() and a store, with no range check. A<br \/>\nmalicious or buggy backend can set req_id past PVCALLS_NR_RSP_PER_RING<br \/>\nand drive an out-of-bounds write past the bedata allocation.<\/p>\n<p>req_id was also declared int while the wire field rsp-&gt;req_id is u32, so<br \/>\na range check on the signed value alone is insufficient: a backend<br \/>\nreq_id of 0xffffffff becomes -1, passes a &gt;= PVCALLS_NR_RSP_PER_RING<br \/>\ntest and indexes bedata-&gt;rsp[-1]. Declare req_id as u32 so a single<br \/>\nbound covers both ends.<\/p>\n<p>A backend that sends an out-of-range req_id has violated the wire<br \/>\nprotocol, so rather than silently dropping the response, log once and<br \/>\nstop trusting the backend: set bedata-&gt;disabled. The event handler then<br \/>\nignores further responses, and the request paths that wait for a<br \/>\nresponse return -EIO instead of blocking forever. This mirrors the<br \/>\nfatal-error handling xen-netback uses (xenvif_fatal_tx_err()).<\/p>\n<p>The pvcalls frontend currently trusts its backend, so this is not a<br \/>\nclassic-Xen security issue, but it matters for hardening PV frontends<br \/>\nagainst malicious backends (confidential and disaggregated deployments).<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<\/p>\n<p>xen\/pvcalls: bound backend response req_id before indexing rsp[]<\/p>\n<p>pvcalls_front_event_handler() takes req_id directly from the<br \/>\nback<\/p>\n","protected":false},"template":"","meta":[],"categories":[],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-7023","vuln","type-vuln","status-publish","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/vuln\/7023","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/vuln"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/vuln"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=7023"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=7023"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=7023"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}