{"id":6965,"date":"2026-09-04T18:49:22","date_gmt":"2026-09-04T10:49:22","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/?vuln=cve-2026-72338"},"modified":"2026-09-04T18:49:22","modified_gmt":"2026-09-04T10:49:22","slug":"cve-2026-72338","status":"publish","type":"vuln","link":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/?vuln=cve-2026-72338","title":{"rendered":"CVE-2026-72338 [HIGH] &#8211; In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet\/sched: act_pedit:"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<\/p>\n<p>net\/sched: act_pedit: fix TOCTOU heap OOB write in tc offload<\/p>\n<p>There is a TOCTOU race condition in flower lockless approach between sizing<br \/>\na flow_rule buffer and filling it.<br \/>\nzdi-disclosures@trendmicro.com reports:<br \/>\nThe cls_flower classifier operates with TCF_PROTO_OPS_DOIT_UNLOCKED<br \/>\n(fl_change runs without RTNL), while RTM_NEWACTION holds RTNL, so the<br \/>\nindependent locking domains make the race reachable in practice.  KASAN<br \/>\nconfirms:<br \/>\n  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in tcf_pedit_offload_act_setup+0x81b\/0x930<br \/>\n  Write of size 4 at addr ffff888001f27520 by task poc-toctou\/312<br \/>\n  The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of<br \/>\n   allocated 288-byte region [ffff888001f27400, ffff888001f27520)<br \/>\n   (cache kmalloc-512)<\/p>\n<p>Note: The result is a heap OOB write attacker-controlled content into the<br \/>\nadjacent slab object (requires CAP_NET_ADMIN).<\/p>\n<p>The fix introduces reading tcfp_nkeys under act-&gt;tcfa_lock in all places<br \/>\nusing a new tcf_pedit_nkeys_locked() which replaces the old tcf_pedit_nkeys().<br \/>\nAdditionally we close the remaining TOCTOU window between the sizing read and<br \/>\nthe fill reads by more careful accounting.<br \/>\nRather than silently truncating the key count, which leads to incorrect<br \/>\naction semantics offloaded to hardware and secondary OOB writes if<br \/>\nthe remaining capacity is zero or consumed by prior actions, we enforce<br \/>\nremaining capacity checks and return -ENOSPC if the required space exceeds<br \/>\nthe remaining capacity.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<\/p>\n<p>net\/sched: act_pedit: fix TOCTOU heap OOB write in tc offload<\/p>\n<p>There is a TOCTOU race condition in flower lockless approach between<\/p>\n","protected":false},"template":"","meta":[],"categories":[],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-6965","vuln","type-vuln","status-publish","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/vuln\/6965","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/vuln"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/vuln"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=6965"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=6965"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=6965"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}