{"id":6810,"date":"2026-09-04T18:49:18","date_gmt":"2026-09-04T10:49:18","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/?vuln=cve-2026-72160"},"modified":"2026-09-04T18:49:18","modified_gmt":"2026-09-04T10:49:18","slug":"cve-2026-72160","status":"publish","type":"vuln","link":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/?vuln=cve-2026-72160","title":{"rendered":"CVE-2026-72160 [HIGH] &#8211; In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nocfs2: reject dinodes"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<\/p>\n<p>ocfs2: reject dinodes with non-canonical i_mode type<\/p>\n<p>Patch series &#8220;ocfs2: harden inode validators against forged metadata&#8221;, v2.<\/p>\n<p>This series adds three structural checks to OCFS2 dinode validation so<br \/>\nmalformed on-disk fields are rejected before ocfs2_populate_inode() copies<br \/>\nthem into the in-core inode.<\/p>\n<p>The checks cover:<\/p>\n<p>  &#8211; i_mode values whose type bits do not name a canonical POSIX file<br \/>\n    type;<br \/>\n  &#8211; non-device dinodes whose id1.dev1.i_rdev field is non-zero; and<br \/>\n  &#8211; non-inline dinodes that claim non-zero i_size while i_clusters is<br \/>\n    zero, covering directories unconditionally and regular files on<br \/>\n    non-sparse volumes.<\/p>\n<p>The normal read path reports these through ocfs2_error(), matching the<br \/>\nexisting suballoc-slot, inline-data, chain-list, and refcount checks.  The<br \/>\nonline filecheck path uses the same structural predicates but keeps its<br \/>\nown reporting contract, returning OCFS2_FILECHECK_ERR_INVALIDINO instead<br \/>\nof calling ocfs2_error().<\/p>\n<p>This patch (of 3):<\/p>\n<p>ocfs2_validate_inode_block() currently accepts any non-zero i_mode value.<br \/>\nocfs2_populate_inode() then copies that mode verbatim into inode-&gt;i_mode<br \/>\nand dispatches on i_mode &amp; S_IFMT to the file\/dir\/symlink\/special_file<br \/>\niops; an unrecognised type falls through to ocfs2_special_file_iops and<br \/>\ninit_special_inode().<\/p>\n<p>Reject dinodes whose type bits do not name one of the seven canonical<br \/>\nPOSIX file types.  Use fs_umode_to_ftype(), the same generic file-type<br \/>\nconversion helper OCFS2 already uses for directory entries, so the<br \/>\naccepted inode type set matches the kernel file-type vocabulary instead of<br \/>\nopen-coding a local switch.<\/p>\n<p>Apply the same structural check to the online filecheck read path.<br \/>\nfilecheck keeps its own error namespace, so it reports malformed i_mode<br \/>\nthrough the filecheck logger and OCFS2_FILECHECK_ERR_INVALIDINO instead of<br \/>\ncalling ocfs2_error(), but it must not allow a malformed dinode to proceed<br \/>\ninto ocfs2_populate_inode().<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<\/p>\n<p>ocfs2: reject dinodes with non-canonical i_mode type<\/p>\n<p>Patch series &#8220;ocfs2: harden inode validators against forged metadata&#8221;, v2.<\/p>\n<p>T<\/p>\n","protected":false},"template":"","meta":[],"categories":[],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-6810","vuln","type-vuln","status-publish","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/vuln\/6810","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/vuln"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/vuln"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=6810"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=6810"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=6810"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}