In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<\/p>\n
wifi: mwifiex: bound uAP association event IEs to the event buffer<\/p>\n
mwifiex_process_uap_event() handles EVENT_UAP_STA_ASSOC by exposing the
\n(re)association request IEs that the firmware copies into the event:<\/p>\n
\tsinfo->assoc_req_ies = &event->data[len];
\n\tlen = (u8 *)sinfo->assoc_req_ies – (u8 *)&event->frame_control;
\n\tsinfo->assoc_req_ies_len = le16_to_cpu(event->len) – (u16)len;<\/p>\n
event->len is supplied by the device firmware and is never validated,
\nand the subtraction is unchecked. assoc_req_ies points into
\nadapter->event_body[MAX_EVENT_SIZE], a fixed-size array embedded in the
\nkmalloc()’d struct mwifiex_adapter.<\/p>\n
On the ap_11n_enabled path mwifiex_set_sta_ht_cap() walks these IEs with
\ncfg80211_find_ie(), whose for_each_element() loop dereferences each
\nelement header. A firmware-reported event->len larger than the bytes
\nactually received makes assoc_req_ies_len describe IEs that extend past
\nevent_body, so the walk reads out of the adapter slab object, a
\nslab-out-of-bounds read (KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in cfg80211_find_ie).
\nAn event->len smaller than the header instead makes the int subtraction
\nnegative, which wraps to a huge size_t when stored in assoc_req_ies_len.
\nThe same length is handed to cfg80211_new_sta(), so a more modest
\nover-claim can also copy stale event_body bytes into the
\nNL80211_CMD_NEW_STATION notification.<\/p>\n
A malicious or malfunctioning mwifiex device (USB\/SDIO\/PCIe) can deliver
\nsuch an event while the interface is in AP\/uAP mode.<\/p>\n
Validate event->len before use: reject a length that underflows the
\nheader or that would place the IEs outside the event_body[] buffer the
\nevent was copied into. event->len here is struct mwifiex_assoc_event.len,
\na payload field internal to this event, not the transport frame length,
\nso it is validated in this handler rather than at the generic
\nMWIFIEX_TYPE_EVENT receive path, which only sees the event cause and the
\ntransport frame length. The bound is against event_body[MAX_EVENT_SIZE]
\nrather than the actually-received length because the transports store the
\nevent differently (USB and SDIO leave the 4-byte event header in
\nevent_skb, PCIe strips it via skb_pull), whereas event_body is the single
\nfixed buffer all of them copy the event into. This is the event-path
\nanalogue of the receive-path bounds checks added in commit 119585281617
\n(“wifi: mwifiex: Fix OOB and integer underflow when rx packets”).<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<\/p>\n
wifi: mwifiex: bound uAP association event IEs to the event buffer<\/p>\n
mwifiex_process_uap_event() handles EVENT_UAP_STA_ASSOC by expo<\/p>\n","protected":false},"template":"","meta":[],"categories":[],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-5426","vuln","type-vuln","status-publish","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/vuln\/5426","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/vuln"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/vuln"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=5426"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=5426"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=5426"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}