{"id":5064,"date":"2026-09-04T18:46:58","date_gmt":"2026-09-04T10:46:58","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/?vuln=cve-2026-48085"},"modified":"2026-09-04T18:46:58","modified_gmt":"2026-09-04T10:46:58","slug":"cve-2026-48085","status":"publish","type":"vuln","link":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/?vuln=cve-2026-48085","title":{"rendered":"CVE-2026-48085 [CRITICAL] &#8211; OpenReception&#8217;s appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>OpenReception&#8217;s appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.1, a fully provisioned OpenReception instance accepts unauthenticated POST requests to `\/setup\/create-admin-account` and creates additional GLOBAL_ADMIN accounts without verifying that an admin already exists. Any unauthenticated network attacker who can submit a same-origin form POST gains full platform-level administrative control. The newly created account is `is_active=true` with `confirmation_state=ACCESS_GRANTED` and does not require completing email confirmation; the GLOBAL_ADMIN row is created active and immediately usable. Login and tenant enumeration succeed without any further interaction. This is distinct from the deployment race condition already documented on the `Claiming an instance` page. That documented race covers the window between deployment and first claim. The bug reported here works after the operator has properly claimed and configured the instance: the layout-level guard that protects the setup page only redirects on GET, while the `default` form action handler creates the user without rechecking `adminExists()`. Three GLOBAL_ADMIN accounts were created in succession during testing, with no rate limiting observed. Audit-specific event logging beyond standard application logs was not assessed; the standard `[error]` line that surfaces only when a uniqueness conflict is hit is not the same as a security event for &#8220;additional admin created post-claim&#8221;. The form post is rejected for browser drive-by CSRF by SvelteKit&#8217;s built-in same-origin check, but any tool that supplies a matching `Origin` header (curl, Burp, automated scanners, server-side proxies) bypasses this trivially. No additional preconditions exist. Users should upgrade to version 1.0.1 to receive a patch.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>OpenReception&#8217;s appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.1, a fully provisioned OpenReception instance accepts unauthenticated P<\/p>\n","protected":false},"template":"","meta":[],"categories":[],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-5064","vuln","type-vuln","status-publish","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/vuln\/5064","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/vuln"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/vuln"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=5064"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=5064"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=5064"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}