{"id":44282,"date":"2026-10-22T04:40:29","date_gmt":"2026-10-21T20:40:29","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/?vuln=cve-2026-79976"},"modified":"2026-10-22T04:40:29","modified_gmt":"2026-10-21T20:40:29","slug":"cve-2026-79976","status":"publish","type":"vuln","link":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/?vuln=cve-2026-79976","title":{"rendered":"CVE-2026-79976 [HIGH] &#8211; The MCTP-over-I2C+GPIO target binding in subsys\/pmci\/mctp\/mctp_i2c_gpio_target.c emulates"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>The MCTP-over-I2C+GPIO target binding in subsys\/pmci\/mctp\/mctp_i2c_gpio_target.c emulates a small pseudo-register file, where the bus controller first writes a register number and then writes or reads payload bytes. The selected register (b-&gt;reg_addr) and the data-phase flag (b-&gt;rxtx) were never cleared when the controller issued an I2C STOP, so after a completed transfer the target still had a data register selected while the packet buffer that register refers to had already been consumed and set to NULL by mctp_i2c_gpio_target_stop().<\/p>\n<p>A controller on the bus can re-enter the same branch of mctp_i2c_gpio_target_stop() with a NULL buffer using two ordinary transactions and no authentication: first a normal packet write to MCTP_I2C_GPIO_RX_MSG_ADDR followed by STOP (which delivers and frees b-&gt;rx_pkt), then a bare read transaction followed by STOP. The failing read_requested() call leaves the stale state untouched and the I2C driver still delivers the STOP callback, which then calls mctp_bus_rx() with a NULL packet. The symmetric case exists on the transmit side, where the stale MCTP_I2C_GPIO_TX_MSG_ADDR selection dereferences b-&gt;tx_pkt-&gt;end after b-&gt;tx_pkt has been cleared and additionally signals b-&gt;tx_complete a second time, causing the next outbound packet to be dropped.<\/p>\n<p>The dereference happens in the I2C target interrupt handler, so on any target that traps accesses to address 0 the result is a fatal exception and a device reset or halt \u2014 a denial of service inflicted by any device able to act as controller on the shared management bus (for example compromised firmware on a peer MCTP endpoint or on the BMC). On parts where address 0 is readable, the impact degrades to a malformed packet buffer being handed to the MCTP stack and lost transmit packets. No attacker-controlled value is written and no confidentiality or integrity boundary is crossed.<\/p>\n<p>The fix resets b-&gt;reg_addr to MCTP_I2C_GPIO_INVALID_ADDR and clears b-&gt;rxtx at every STOP, so a new register must be selected before any data phase can run again. Only builds that opt into the experimental CONFIG_MCTP subsystem with CONFIG_MCTP_I2C_GPIO_TARGET=y are affected.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>The MCTP-over-I2C+GPIO target binding in subsys\/pmci\/mctp\/mctp_i2c_gpio_target.c emulates a small pseudo-register file, where the bus controller first writes a register number and then writes or reads<\/p>\n","protected":false},"template":"","meta":[],"categories":[],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-44282","vuln","type-vuln","status-publish","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/vuln\/44282","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/vuln"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/vuln"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=44282"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=44282"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=44282"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}