{"id":41277,"date":"2026-10-19T00:32:58","date_gmt":"2026-10-18T16:32:58","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/?vuln=cve-2026-98805"},"modified":"2026-10-19T00:32:58","modified_gmt":"2026-10-18T16:32:58","slug":"cve-2026-98805","status":"publish","type":"vuln","link":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/?vuln=cve-2026-98805","title":{"rendered":"CVE-2026-98805 &#8211; In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ntipc: prevent GCM non"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<\/p>\n<p>tipc: prevent GCM nonce reuse on peer key changes<\/p>\n<p>TIPC can encrypt traffic between nodes using a different transmit key<br \/>\nfor each node. In this mode, the AES-GCM nonce for a packet sent to a<br \/>\nknown peer consists of a 32-bit prefix (a per-key salt XOR the peer&#8217;s<br \/>\naddress) followed by a 64-bit counter. That counter is stored in the<br \/>\npeer&#8217;s RX crypto object. When the peer reports a change in which key<br \/>\nit uses to receive packets, TIPC resets this counter. The sender can<br \/>\nstill be using the same TX key and salt, so subsequent packets reuse<br \/>\nearlier nonces. This nonce reuse breaks confidentiality and exposes<br \/>\nGCM&#8217;s authentication key. This makes forgeries trivial: an attacker<br \/>\ncan exploit CTR malleability to alter captured ciphertexts and use the<br \/>\nrecovered authentication key to compute a valid tag for the modified<br \/>\nciphertext, under the same key and nonce.<\/p>\n<p>Use the TX key&#8217;s existing aead-&gt;seqno counter instead. All encryptions<br \/>\nusing that key object share the same atomic counter, so concurrent<br \/>\nencryptions get distinct nonce counter values. The counter survives<br \/>\nkey activation and peer reconnection, and peer key-status reports<br \/>\ncannot reset it. This prevents those transitions from causing nonce<br \/>\nreuse while the same TX key remains installed.<\/p>\n<p>The nonce format is unchanged, and receivers do not require consecutive<br \/>\ncounter values, so sharing the counter across peers remains compatible<br \/>\nwith existing receivers. A pre-existing check still invokes key<br \/>\nrevocation in the unlikely event that the counter wraps to zero.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<\/p>\n<p>tipc: prevent GCM nonce reuse on peer key changes<\/p>\n<p>TIPC can encrypt traffic between nodes using a different transmit key<br \/>\nfor each n<\/p>\n","protected":false},"template":"","meta":[],"categories":[],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-41277","vuln","type-vuln","status-publish","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/vuln\/41277","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/vuln"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/vuln"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=41277"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=41277"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=41277"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}