{"id":39433,"date":"2026-10-16T00:35:51","date_gmt":"2026-10-15T16:35:51","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/?vuln=cve-2026-75083"},"modified":"2026-10-16T00:35:51","modified_gmt":"2026-10-15T16:35:51","slug":"cve-2026-75083","status":"publish","type":"vuln","link":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/?vuln=cve-2026-75083","title":{"rendered":"CVE-2026-75083 [MEDIUM] &#8211; The receive path of the NXP KW41Z IEEE 802.15.4 driver, kw41z_rx() in drivers\/ieee802154\/i"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>The receive path of the NXP KW41Z IEEE 802.15.4 driver, kw41z_rx() in drivers\/ieee802154\/ieee802154_kw41z.c, computed the payload size as pkt_len = len &#8211; KW41Z_FCS_LENGTH in a uint8_t, where len is the frame length reported by the radio. The interrupt handler kw41z_isr() obtained that length from the RX_FRAME_LENGTH field of the ZLL IRQSTS register \u2014 a copy of the PHY header length byte of the frame received over the air \u2014 and only rejected the value zero. A reported length of one therefore underflowed to pkt_len == 255.<\/p>\n<p>Because the packet is allocated with NET_AF_UNSPEC on a non-Ethernet L2, net_pkt_rx_alloc_with_buffer() does not clamp the request to the interface MTU; with the default fixed-size buffer pool (CONFIG_NET_BUF_FIXED_DATA_SIZE, CONFIG_NET_BUF_DATA_SIZE=128) the allocation succeeded as a chain of two fragments. The subsequent register-to-buffer copy loops write into the first fragment only, so 255 bytes were written into a 128-byte net_buf data block, overrunning it by up to 127 bytes into adjacent network-buffer-pool memory, and reading up to 128 bytes past the end of the radio&#8217;s PKT_BUFFER_RX register array.<\/p>\n<p>The length field originates from an unauthenticated frame transmitted by any device within 802.15.4 radio range, and is captured by the hardware at PHY-header time \u2014 before frame filtering has completed \u2014 while the handler samples it after clearing the interrupt status, so an attacker flooding frames with a length byte of one can drive the underflow. The impact is memory corruption in the shared receive buffer pool from interrupt context, most plausibly a crash or corruption of other packets&#8217; data; the overflowing bytes are radio register contents rather than attacker-authored data, which bounds the integrity impact.<\/p>\n<p>The fix rejects any length below KW41Z_FCS_LENGTH and additionally verifies net_buf_tailroom() of the first fragment before the copy loops, which also covers the CONFIG_NET_L2_OPENTHREAD variant of the size computation.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>The receive path of the NXP KW41Z IEEE 802.15.4 driver, kw41z_rx() in drivers\/ieee802154\/ieee802154_kw41z.c, computed the payload size as pkt_len = len &#8211; KW41Z_FCS_LENGTH in a uint8_t, where len is th<\/p>\n","protected":false},"template":"","meta":[],"categories":[],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-39433","vuln","type-vuln","status-publish","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/vuln\/39433","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/vuln"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/vuln"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=39433"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=39433"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=39433"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}