H3C HDM Family-A verifies the RSA signature of a firmware image against a public key it reads from the mutable file `\/conf\/public.pem`. That file is writable by an authenticated Redfish client through the `UpdateService.UploadSignKey` action, which stores the uploaded body verbatim after validating only that the multipart filename ends in `.pem`. An administrator, or any account with `firmware-update` privilege, can therefore replace the trust anchor with their own key, sign a malicious image with the matching private key, and have it pass verification. Family-A has no hardware root-of-trust (no PFR) to catch the substituted key.\u00a0<\/p>\n
This was observed on H3C HDM Family-A G5 HDM 6.14.01. H3C HDM Family-A G3\/G5 builds carrying the Redfish\/DRE update tree appear to be affected. HDM2 uses a different update path and is not covered by this finding.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
H3C HDM Family-A verifies the RSA signature of a firmware image against a public key it reads from the mutable file `\/conf\/public.pem`. That file is writable by an authenticated Redfish client through<\/p>\n","protected":false},"template":"","meta":[],"categories":[],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-36927","vuln","type-vuln","status-publish","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/vuln\/36927","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/vuln"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/vuln"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=36927"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=36927"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=36927"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}