{"id":32522,"date":"2026-10-03T20:32:11","date_gmt":"2026-10-03T12:32:11","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/?vuln=cve-2026-71886"},"modified":"2026-10-03T20:32:11","modified_gmt":"2026-10-03T12:32:11","slug":"cve-2026-71886","status":"publish","type":"vuln","link":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/?vuln=cve-2026-71886","title":{"rendered":"CVE-2026-71886 &#8211; In Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.86, the high-level OpenPGP certificate API accepted a t"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>In Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.86, the high-level OpenPGP certificate API accepted a third-party certification or trust delegation from any component key of the issuing certificate, without requiring that component to have been granted the authority to certify. OpenPGPCertificate.getCertificationBy() and getDelegationBy() resolve a third-party signature by matching its issuer key identifier against every key of the third-party certificate, then verify the issuing component&#8217;s binding chain and the signature itself; nothing checked that the issuing component carried the RFC 9580 sec. 5.2.3.29 certification key flag (CERTIFY_OTHER) when the signature was created. A subkey bound only with SIGN_DATA &#8211; the online signing subkey of exactly the offline-primary arrangement those key flags exist to express &#8211; could therefore issue a positive User ID certification over an attacker-controlled identity, or a full-trust depth-one direct-key delegation of introducer trust, and the API returned it as a valid signature chain attributed to the third-party certificate. An application treating getCertificationBy(&#8230;).isValid() or getDelegationBy(&#8230;) as an identity or trusted-introducer decision would attribute the attacker&#8217;s assertion to the offline primary key. The same held for a legacy RSA subkey bound only for encryption, whose algorithm is nonetheless able to sign. This does not forge the primary key&#8217;s signature or recover any private key; it promotes an already-compromised restricted subkey to the primary key&#8217;s identity-issuing authority, defeating the containment the key-flag separation provides. A third-party certification or delegation is now attributed to the issuing certificate only when the component key that made it is the primary key, or is a subkey holding CERTIFY_OTHER when the signature was created, so certification-capable subkeys continue to be accepted; primary keys are accepted whatever their key flags say, since a primary key is certification-capable by construction and certificates carrying no key flags subpacket at all are common. Third-party revocations are deliberately outside the rule, since declining to honour one would keep trust alive rather than withdraw it.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>In Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.86, the high-level OpenPGP certificate API accepted a third-party certification or trust delegation from any component key of the issuing certificate, without requir<\/p>\n","protected":false},"template":"","meta":[],"categories":[],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-32522","vuln","type-vuln","status-publish","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/vuln\/32522","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/vuln"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/vuln"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=32522"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=32522"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=32522"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}