{"id":29310,"date":"2026-09-25T20:32:23","date_gmt":"2026-09-25T12:32:23","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/?vuln=cve-2026-98156"},"modified":"2026-09-25T20:32:23","modified_gmt":"2026-09-25T12:32:23","slug":"cve-2026-98156","status":"publish","type":"vuln","link":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/?vuln=cve-2026-98156","title":{"rendered":"CVE-2026-98156 &#8211; In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm\/virtio: use the D"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<\/p>\n<p>drm\/virtio: use the DMA API for resource backing on Xen<\/p>\n<p>On a Xen PV domain page addresses bear no relation to the real machine<br \/>\naddresses the host would have to use to reach it.<br \/>\nvirtio_ring.c handles this correctly, vring_use_map_api() returns true<br \/>\nfor any xen_domain() regardless of VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM.<\/p>\n<p>virtio-gpu makes the same decision independently, but its copy<br \/>\nlooks only at the feature bit:<\/p>\n<p>\tbool use_dma_api = !virtio_has_dma_quirk(vgdev-&gt;vdev);<\/p>\n<p>QEMU does not set iommu_platform on virtio-vga by default, so<br \/>\nVIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM is not negotiated, use_dma_api is false, and<br \/>\nvirtio_gpu_object_shmem_init() describes the framebuffer&#8217;s backing pages<br \/>\nto the host with sg_phys().  Those are guest-physical addresses. In a PV<br \/>\ndomain they resolve, on the host side, to pages belonging to some other<br \/>\ndomain, so the host scans out unrelated memory.<\/p>\n<p>Move the decision into virtio_gpu_use_dma_api() and give it the<br \/>\nxen_domain() check, like vring_use_map_api() has. This<br \/>\nadditionally enables the dma_sync_sgtable_for_device() calls in<br \/>\nvirtgpu_vq.c, which are required for correctness whenever swiotlb<br \/>\nis in play.<\/p>\n<p>Reproduced with a Xen 4.21 PV dom0 nested inside QEMU 8.2 with<br \/>\nvirtio-vga, on both a distro 6.8 kernel and 6.18 LTS. A PVH dom0<br \/>\nworks fine and doesn&#8217;t need this fix because it is identity-mapped,<br \/>\nonly PV dom0s are affected.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<\/p>\n<p>drm\/virtio: use the DMA API for resource backing on Xen<\/p>\n<p>On a Xen PV domain page addresses bear no relation to the real machine<br \/>\nadd<\/p>\n","protected":false},"template":"","meta":[],"categories":[],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-29310","vuln","type-vuln","status-publish","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/vuln\/29310","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/vuln"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/vuln"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=29310"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=29310"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=29310"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}