In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<\/p>\n
bpf: Fix REG INVARIANTS VIOLATION on speculative pointer arithmetic<\/p>\n
Take the following unprivileged program as an example:<\/p>\n
\tr0 = bpf_map_lookup_elem(…)\t\/* PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, offset 0 *\/
\n\t…
\n\t14: r0 += r1\t\t\t\/* r1 is a bounded scalar *\/
\n\t15: r9 = r0<\/p>\n
Loading it triggers a verifier warning from reg_bounds_sanity_check():<\/p>\n
\tverifier bug: REG INVARIANTS VIOLATION (alu): const subreg tnum out
\n\tof sync with range bounds r64={.base=0x0, .size=0x0}
\n\tr32={.base=0x0, .size=0xffffffff} var_off=(0x0, 0x0)<\/p>\n
What happens:<\/p>\n
1. Processing insn 14 (r0 += r1) in adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(), the new
\n offset is computed into dst_reg’s var_off and 32\/64-bit ranges.<\/p>\n
2. Because pointer registers do not track 32-bit subregister bounds,
\n __mark_reg32_unbounded() first sets r32 to the full range; r32 is
\n re-derived from the offset at the end of the function by
\n reg_bounds_sync().<\/p>\n
3. On the unprivileged path, sanitize_ptr_alu() is called and, via
\n sanitize_speculative_path() -> push_stack(), snapshots the current
\n register state and schedules the next instruction (insn 15) to be
\n verified directly as a speculative path.<\/p>\n
4. That snapshot is taken between step 2 and the final reg_bounds_sync():
\n at this point dst_reg’s var_off still holds the (const) original
\n offset while r32 has just been blanked to the full range, i.e. the two
\n are out of sync. When the speculative path later verifies insn 15
\n (r9 = r0), the inconsistent state reaches reg_bounds_sanity_check() and
\n trips the warning.<\/p>\n
var_off and the 32-bit range must always be consistent. There are two
\nways to keep the snapshot consistent:<\/p>\n
1. sync var_off and r32 before the snapshot so they match, or
\n 2. leave r32 at its original (already consistent) value and blank it
\n only after the snapshot.<\/p>\n
The whole point of sanitize_ptr_alu() is to insert a harmless masking
\nsequence that keeps the access in bounds under speculation, so the state
\nit snapshots should faithfully represent that. Take approach 2: move
\n__mark_reg32_unbounded() to after sanitize_ptr_alu(), so the speculative
\nsnapshot keeps the pointer’s original, consistent r32. The non-speculative
\npath is unchanged: r32 is still blanked before the offset is applied and
\nre-derived by reg_bounds_sync().<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<\/p>\n
bpf: Fix REG INVARIANTS VIOLATION on speculative pointer arithmetic<\/p>\n
Take the following unprivileged program as an example:<\/p>\n
\tr0 = <\/p>\n","protected":false},"template":"","meta":[],"categories":[],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-29305","vuln","type-vuln","status-publish","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/vuln\/29305","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/vuln"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/vuln"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=29305"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=29305"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=29305"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}