{"id":29092,"date":"2026-09-25T20:31:51","date_gmt":"2026-09-25T12:31:51","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/?vuln=cve-2026-97936"},"modified":"2026-09-25T20:31:51","modified_gmt":"2026-09-25T12:31:51","slug":"cve-2026-97936","status":"publish","type":"vuln","link":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/?vuln=cve-2026-97936","title":{"rendered":"CVE-2026-97936 &#8211; In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ntracing: Fix memory c"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<\/p>\n<p>tracing: Fix memory corruption from the histogram stacktrace modifier<\/p>\n<p>parse_field() sets HIST_FIELD_FL_STACKTRACE from the &#8220;.stacktrace&#8221;<br \/>\nmodifier before it looks the field name up, and nothing afterwards<br \/>\nchecks that the name resolved to a field which holds a stacktrace.<br \/>\ncreate_hist_field() picks HIST_FIELD_FN_STACK on the strength of the<br \/>\nfield pointer alone, which reads a __data_loc word from the record and<br \/>\nfollows its low 16 bits as an offset into the same record.<br \/>\nevent_hist_trigger() takes the first word there as an entry count and<br \/>\ncopies that many longs into a 31 entry array:<\/p>\n<p>\tn_entries = *stack;<br \/>\n\tmemcpy(entries, ++stack, n_entries * sizeof(unsigned long));<\/p>\n<p>Neither end of that copy is bounded, and the count is whatever the event<br \/>\nholds at the offset, so any field will do:<\/p>\n<p>  # cd \/sys\/kernel\/tracing\/events\/sched\/sched_process_fork<br \/>\n  # echo &#8216;hist:keys=parent_pid.stacktrace&#8217; &gt; trigger<br \/>\n  # (true)<\/p>\n<p>  BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008<br \/>\n  RIP: 0010:rb_insert_color+0x18\/0x130<br \/>\n   timerqueue_linked_add+0x7e\/0xd0<br \/>\n   enqueue_hrtimer+0x39\/0xb0<br \/>\n   __hrtimer_run_queues+0x10f\/0x1f0<\/p>\n<p>  RIP: 0010:memcpy+0xc\/0x30<br \/>\n   event_hist_trigger+0x165\/0x690<\/p>\n<p>The timer interrupt landed on the rbtree the copy had already run over.<br \/>\nNo debug options are needed for this; KASAN reports the same write as an<br \/>\nout-of-bounds read of 13835058055416381440 bytes.<\/p>\n<p>Documentation\/trace\/histogram.rst already states the rule, &#8220;must be a<br \/>\nlong[] type&#8221;, so enforce it once the name has been resolved. Names which<br \/>\nresolve to no field at all, &#8220;hitcount.stacktrace&#8221; and the common_*<br \/>\npseudo-fields, are refused for the same reason: they hold no stacktrace<br \/>\nto read.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<\/p>\n<p>tracing: Fix memory corruption from the histogram stacktrace modifier<\/p>\n<p>parse_field() sets HIST_FIELD_FL_STACKTRACE from the &#8220;.stack<\/p>\n","protected":false},"template":"","meta":[],"categories":[],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-29092","vuln","type-vuln","status-publish","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/vuln\/29092","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/vuln"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/vuln"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=29092"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=29092"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=29092"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}