{"id":29089,"date":"2026-09-25T20:31:51","date_gmt":"2026-09-25T12:31:51","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/?vuln=cve-2026-97933"},"modified":"2026-09-25T20:31:51","modified_gmt":"2026-09-25T12:31:51","slug":"cve-2026-97933","status":"publish","type":"vuln","link":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/?vuln=cve-2026-97933","title":{"rendered":"CVE-2026-97933 &#8211; In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ntracing: Take trace_a"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<\/p>\n<p>tracing: Take trace_array reference when opening a tracer options file<\/p>\n<p>When a tracer option file is opened, it is passed a descriptor that points<br \/>\nto an element on the trace_array&#8217;s topts array. This element has<br \/>\ninformation to find the trace array and other information. It uses this<br \/>\nelement to take a reference of the trace_array so that the trace_array<br \/>\ndoes not get removed while this file is opened.<\/p>\n<p>Unfortunately, there&#8217;s a race condition where the element itself could be<br \/>\nfreed by the removal of the instance the trace_array represents causing a<br \/>\nuse-after-free as this element that is used to find the trace_array to<br \/>\nincrement its reference counter is also freed when the instance is<br \/>\nremoved.<\/p>\n<p>To solve this, add a trace_array_tracer_options_get() helper function that<br \/>\nwill take the address of the element that is passed to the open function<br \/>\nby the inode-&gt;i_private pointer and search all the trace_arrays under a<br \/>\nlock to find the one that the element&#8217;s address is in the range of the<br \/>\ntrace_arrays topts array elements. When a match happens, that trace_array&#8217;s<br \/>\nreference would be increased.<\/p>\n<p>Note, there&#8217;s a race where if an admin was deleting and creating trace<br \/>\ninstances at the same time and the memory of the old trace_array&#8217;s array<br \/>\nmatched the memory of the new trace_array that it could in theory open the<br \/>\noption from the wrong trace array. But we do not care because it would be<br \/>\nstupid to perform that kind of action. As long as the only thing that can<br \/>\nhappen is that the option from the wrong trace array is used and doesn&#8217;t<br \/>\ncrash the kernel it will only make the user confused. But if they are<br \/>\ndoing something stupid like this, they are already confused, so no harm<br \/>\ndone.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<\/p>\n<p>tracing: Take trace_array reference when opening a tracer options file<\/p>\n<p>When a tracer option file is opened, it is passed a descrip<\/p>\n","protected":false},"template":"","meta":[],"categories":[],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-29089","vuln","type-vuln","status-publish","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/vuln\/29089","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/vuln"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/vuln"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=29089"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=29089"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=29089"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}