{"id":29044,"date":"2026-09-25T20:31:44","date_gmt":"2026-09-25T12:31:44","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/?vuln=cve-2026-97612"},"modified":"2026-09-25T20:31:44","modified_gmt":"2026-09-25T12:31:44","slug":"cve-2026-97612","status":"publish","type":"vuln","link":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/?vuln=cve-2026-97612","title":{"rendered":"CVE-2026-97612 &#8211; In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: mpls: clear inne"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<\/p>\n<p>net: mpls: clear inner_protocol when the last label is popped<\/p>\n<p>skb_mpls_push() records the pre-encapsulation network header once, gated<br \/>\non !skb-&gt;inner_protocol. skb_mpls_pop() never clears that record, so it<br \/>\noutlives the encapsulation it describes.<\/p>\n<p>Open vSwitch can then re-push MPLS onto a packet whose<br \/>\ninner_network_header still points at the older, deeper offset: push a<br \/>\nlabel, pop every label, recirculate (ovs_flow_key_update() re-derives<br \/>\nkey-&gt;eth.type and resets network_header, but leaves inner_*), then push<br \/>\nagain. ovs_fragment() trusts the record:<\/p>\n<p>\tskb-&gt;network_header = skb-&gt;inner_network_header;<\/p>\n<p>so skb_network_offset() goes negative. The bound check is signed:<\/p>\n<p>\tif (skb_network_offset(skb) &gt; MAX_L2_LEN)<\/p>\n<p>a negative offset passes it, and prepare_frag() widens the value:<\/p>\n<p>\tunsigned int hlen = skb_network_offset(skb);<br \/>\n\tmemcpy(&amp;data-&gt;l2_data, skb-&gt;data, hlen);<\/p>\n<p>which is a ~4GiB memcpy out of a 30-byte per-CPU buffer.<\/p>\n<p>Reproduced on v7.3-rc1. RDX is the truncated length, (unsigned int)(-8):<\/p>\n<p>  BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffe8ffffc16000<br \/>\n  #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode<br \/>\n  Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI<br \/>\n  RIP: 0010:memcpy+0x8\/0x20<br \/>\n  RDX: 00000000fffffff8 RSI: ffff888105d732db RDI: ffffe8ffffc16000<br \/>\n   prepare_frag+0x3df\/0x4e0<br \/>\n   ovs_fragment+0x589\/0x7e0<br \/>\n   do_output+0x4ce\/0x5e0<br \/>\n   do_execute_actions+0x55d2\/0x7b30<br \/>\n   ovs_execute_actions+0xea\/0x450<\/p>\n<p>Same root-cause shape as commit 975b5b067f52 (&#8220;ipv6: sr: restore network<br \/>\nheader before routing and forwarding&#8221;): a stale network header offset<br \/>\nreaching a consumer that widens it. Here it originates in the MPLS<br \/>\npush\/pop path.<\/p>\n<p>Clear inner_protocol once the packet is no longer MPLS, so a later push<br \/>\nre-records the current header. net\/sched\/act_mpls.c is the only other<br \/>\nskb_mpls_pop() caller and gets the same fix; sch_frag.c saves and<br \/>\nrestores inner_protocol around fragmentation in the same way OVS does.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<\/p>\n<p>net: mpls: clear inner_protocol when the last label is popped<\/p>\n<p>skb_mpls_push() records the pre-encapsulation network header once, g<\/p>\n","protected":false},"template":"","meta":[],"categories":[],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-29044","vuln","type-vuln","status-publish","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/vuln\/29044","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/vuln"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/vuln"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=29044"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=29044"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=29044"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}