{"id":25433,"date":"2026-09-18T00:32:34","date_gmt":"2026-09-17T16:32:34","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/?vuln=cve-2026-86861"},"modified":"2026-09-18T00:32:34","modified_gmt":"2026-09-17T16:32:34","slug":"cve-2026-86861","status":"publish","type":"vuln","link":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/?vuln=cve-2026-86861","title":{"rendered":"CVE-2026-86861 [MEDIUM] &#8211; pgAdmin 4&#8217;s File Manager save_file endpoint, which backs saving from the Query Tool and ER"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>pgAdmin 4&#8217;s File Manager save_file endpoint, which backs saving from the Query Tool and ERD, validated the requested path with Filemanager.check_access_permission() and then opened the file for writing with a plain open() call. CVE-2026-7819 had previously hardened the separate file upload path by opening its target with O_NOFOLLOW, so that the kernel refuses to follow a symbolic link at the final path component, but save_file was left on an unprotected open(). A symbolic link already present when the check ran was rejected by the check itself; the remaining exposure was a link substituted at the final path component in the interval between the check and the write, at which point the write followed the link and landed outside the user&#8217;s storage directory, creating or overwriting an arbitrary file as the operating-system account running pgAdmin.<\/p>\n<p>Exploitation requires the ability to create or replace a symbolic link inside the requesting user&#8217;s storage directory. pgAdmin exposes no interface that creates symbolic links, so this requires filesystem access to the pgAdmin host or to a shared or network-mounted storage backend, together with winning the timing window. The reporter did not achieve a write against a released version, having attempted approximately 63,000 racing requests without success; the reported defect is the uncovered write path rather than a demonstrated sandbox escape.<\/p>\n<p>The fix routes save_file&#8217;s write through the same O_NOFOLLOW-protected helper already used by the upload path, so both File Manager write sinks carry identical kernel-enforced protection, and reports a symbolic-link refusal explicitly instead of surfacing the underlying system error text. Note that files created by save_file are now given mode 0600, inheriting the behaviour introduced for uploads. The protection covers the final path component; substitution of an intermediate directory component is not addressed by this change.<\/p>\n<p>This issue affects pgAdmin 4: from the introduction of the containment check in the File Manager save path before 9.18.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>pgAdmin 4&#8217;s File Manager save_file endpoint, which backs saving from the Query Tool and ERD, validated the requested path with Filemanager.check_access_permission() and then opened the file for writin<\/p>\n","protected":false},"template":"","meta":[],"categories":[],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-25433","vuln","type-vuln","status-publish","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/vuln\/25433","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/vuln"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/vuln"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=25433"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=25433"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=25433"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}