{"id":24671,"date":"2026-09-16T20:32:37","date_gmt":"2026-09-16T12:32:37","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/?vuln=cve-2026-89984"},"modified":"2026-09-16T20:32:37","modified_gmt":"2026-09-16T12:32:37","slug":"cve-2026-89984","status":"publish","type":"vuln","link":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/?vuln=cve-2026-89984","title":{"rendered":"CVE-2026-89984 &#8211; In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nperf\/x86\/intel: Fix k"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<\/p>\n<p>perf\/x86\/intel: Fix kernel address leakages in LBR stack<\/p>\n<p>Before Arch LBR gained CPL filtering support, a user-only branch stack<br \/>\ncould still contain kernel addresses. As a result, kernel branch records<br \/>\nmay be exposed to user space even when PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_USER is<br \/>\nrequested.<\/p>\n<p>For example, on Intel Tiger Lake, the following command can still report<br \/>\nSYSRET\/ERET entries with kernel-space from addresses:<\/p>\n<p>$ .\/perf record -e cycles:p -o &#8211; &#8211;branch-filter any,save_type,u &#8212;<br \/>\n \t.\/perf bench syscall basic &#8211;loop 1000 |<br \/>\n\t.\/perf script -i &#8211; &#8211;fields brstack|tr &#8216; &#8216; &#8216;n&#8217;|<br \/>\n\tgrep -E &#8216;0x[89a-f][0-9a-f]{15}&#8217;<\/p>\n<p>    Total time: 0.000 [sec]<\/p>\n<p>      0.219000 usecs\/op<br \/>\n     4,566,210 ops\/sec<br \/>\n[ perf record: Woken up 1 times to write data ]<br \/>\n[ perf record: Captured and wrote 0.551 MB &#8211; ]<br \/>\n0xffffffff93c001c8\/0x7f12a2b1d647\/P\/-\/-\/16959\/SYSRET\/-<br \/>\n0xffffffff93c001c8\/0x7f12a2b1d5c2\/P\/-\/-\/17535\/SYSRET\/-<br \/>\n0xffffffff93c01928\/0x7f12a2861000\/P\/-\/-\/6719\/ERET\/-<br \/>\n0xffffffff93c01928\/0x7f12a297a000\/P\/-\/-\/8575\/ERET\/-<\/p>\n<p>The problem is that intel_pmu_lbr_filter() does not fully validate the<br \/>\nprivilege level of sampled entries. It filters some mismatches based on<br \/>\nthe branch type and the to address, but it does not reject entries whose<br \/>\nfrom address violates the requested branch privilege filter.<\/p>\n<p>Fix this by extending software filtering to validate both from and to<br \/>\naddresses against br_sel. Any LBR entry contains kernel address does not<br \/>\nmatch the requested user filter is dropped. This prevents kernel<br \/>\naddresses from appearing in user-only branch stacks.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<\/p>\n<p>perf\/x86\/intel: Fix kernel address leakages in LBR stack<\/p>\n<p>Before Arch LBR gained CPL filtering support, a user-only branch stack<br \/>\nco<\/p>\n","protected":false},"template":"","meta":[],"categories":[],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-24671","vuln","type-vuln","status-publish","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/vuln\/24671","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/vuln"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/vuln"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=24671"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=24671"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=24671"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}