{"id":22315,"date":"2026-09-15T00:30:47","date_gmt":"2026-09-14T16:30:47","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/?vuln=cve-2026-82430"},"modified":"2026-09-15T00:30:47","modified_gmt":"2026-09-14T16:30:47","slug":"cve-2026-82430","status":"publish","type":"vuln","link":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/?vuln=cve-2026-82430","title":{"rendered":"CVE-2026-82430 &#8211; Description\n\nWhen launching a Docker or OCI worker, the setuid-root `worker-launcher` firs"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>Description<\/p>\n<p>When launching a Docker or OCI worker, the setuid-root `worker-launcher` first changes ownership of the<br \/>\nentire worker directory to the untrusted topology user, and only afterwards reads and acts on the command<br \/>\nfile that the supervisor wrote into that same directory. The file is opened without `O_NOFOLLOW` and without<br \/>\nre-verifying its owner, so between the ownership change and the read the tenant can replace its contents.<\/p>\n<p>For the Docker path the parsed command is executed with real uid 0, and the command sanitiser is not a<br \/>\nprivilege boundary: it admits `-v` with an arbitrary source, `&#8211;device`, `&#8211;cap-add`, `&#8211;security-opt`,<br \/>\n`&#8211;user` and `&#8211;net`, and copies positional arguments through verbatim. A rewritten file therefore yields an<br \/>\nattacker-authored, root-equivalent container invocation with the host filesystem available.<\/p>\n<p>For the OCI path the same rewrite window applies, and mount validation is structural only, with no<br \/>\nsource or destination allow-list, so arbitrary host paths can be bind-mounted read-write into the<br \/>\ncontainer. The `username` field of the command file is likewise attacker-settable and is checked only<br \/>\nagainst non-root and minimum-uid rules, permitting execution as another tenant&#8217;s uid.<\/p>\n<p>Mitigation<\/p>\n<p>Upgrade to 3.1.0, where the command file is validated before the ownership change and re-verified on open,<br \/>\nand where mount sources and destinations are constrained by configuration.<\/p>\n<p>Users who cannot upgrade immediately should disable Docker and OCI worker isolation, or restrict topology<br \/>\nsubmission on affected supervisors to trusted principals. Note that the launcher must be rebuilt and<br \/>\nreinstalled after upgrading.<\/p>\n<p>Credit<\/p>\n<p>The ASF &#8212; found using Claude agents to study the security of open-source projects, validated and reported by Apache Storm.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Description<\/p>\n<p>When launching a Docker or OCI worker, the setuid-root `worker-launcher` first changes ownership of the<br \/>\nentire worker directory to the untrusted topology user, and only afterwards reads a<\/p>\n","protected":false},"template":"","meta":[],"categories":[],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-22315","vuln","type-vuln","status-publish","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/vuln\/22315","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/vuln"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/vuln"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=22315"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=22315"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=22315"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}