{"id":15182,"date":"2026-09-04T19:02:29","date_gmt":"2026-09-04T11:02:29","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/?vuln=cve-2026-46555"},"modified":"2026-09-04T19:02:29","modified_gmt":"2026-09-04T11:02:29","slug":"cve-2026-46555","status":"publish","type":"vuln","link":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/?vuln=cve-2026-46555","title":{"rendered":"CVE-2026-46555 [HIGH] &#8211; WhatsApp MCP Server is a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for WhatsApp, enabling Claude"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>WhatsApp MCP Server is a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for WhatsApp, enabling Claude to read and send WhatsApp messages. Prior to version 0.2.1, the `whatsapp-bridge` HTTP API listens on `127.0.0.1:8080` without authentication and without Host header validation, and the `\/api\/send` endpoint accepts an absolute `media_path` parameter without confining it to a safe directory. Combined, these issues allow any local process running as the same user as the bridge to send WhatsApp messages from the paired account without authorization; the same caller to read arbitrary files readable by the user (e.g. SSH private keys, browser session data, source code, dotfiles) and exfiltrate them as WhatsApp document attachments; and\/or a remote attacker to trigger the same operations via DNS rebinding from a webpage the user visits, since no Host header validation is performed. In MCP environments, &#8220;local caller&#8221; extends beyond processes the user explicitly launched \u2014 sibling MCP servers, IDE extensions, and tool-triggered flows running in the user&#8217;s session can act as the effective caller. This issue is fixed in whatsapp-mcp v0.2.1 and corresponding Docker images \/ release artifacts. Users should upgrade immediately. The fix introduces bearer token authentication on the bridge HTTP API (configured via environment variable, required on all requests, validated with constant-time comparison); host header allow-list validation to prevent DNS rebinding; and confinement of `media_path` to a configured directory, with rejection of absolute paths outside the root and path traversal sequences. This is a breaking change for clients of the bridge API. For users who cannot immediately upgrade: Stop the bridge, or block loopback access to port 8080, when the bridge is not actively in use; avoid running the bridge alongside untrusted MCP servers, browser extensions, or other untrusted local processes; avoid browsing untrusted sites while the bridge is running (DNS rebinding mitigation); and\/or run the bridge under a dedicated user account or in a sandbox\/container with no access to sensitive files.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>WhatsApp MCP Server is a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for WhatsApp, enabling Claude to read and send WhatsApp messages. Prior to version 0.2.1, the `whatsapp-bridge` HTTP API listens on `127.0.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"template":"","meta":[],"categories":[],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-15182","vuln","type-vuln","status-publish","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/vuln\/15182","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/vuln"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/vuln"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=15182"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=15182"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.54iter.cn\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=15182"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}